0 someone who has been given a concession to sell or do something -- 特许经销商;特许权获得者
In summary, the model presented reflects one method the concessionaire may use to determine the optimal harvesting profile for a particular forest.
Although such a scheme may not induce rationalization of waste generation, collection costs are low and effective, and the concessionaire is encouraged to operate efficiently.
Countries that wish to encourage concessionaires to comply with sustained-yield requirements must implement measures that counter the depletion-accelerating effects of area fees.
A concessionaire who is effectively (though not necessarily legally) free to choose annual harvest area thus might not be equally free to choose annual harvest volume.
This is nearly 6 times the annual profit earned by a concessionaire who abides by the 30-year concession contract.
Most argue that royalties may be too low, resulting in underpricing of the forest resource, reducing incentives for sustainable forest management, and generating windfall profits for concessionaires.
Where this risk is low, governments that wish to discourage concessionaires from violating annual allowable logging areas must couple area fees with measures that counter their depletion-accelerating effects.
Ghani et al. (1992) present the only known rigorous concession-level empirical analysis of concessionaire behavior.