There is no obvious principled reason to make a distinction between the compensation due equally blameless victims on the basis of the cause of that loss.
Genuinely blameless individuals do not engage in criminal conduct, even when the positive incentives are profound.
This was not a conflict in which good and blameless men came to blows.
We culturally distinguish between blameworthy and blameless suffering.
In cases of blameless wrongdoing, everything in this case that maximizes the good and that agents can bring about is right.
And let us grant the choice theorist's assumption against determinists that incapacity in this sense intelligibly distinguishes the blameless from the possibly blameworthy.
Distinguishing between blameworthy and blameless suffering is easier than measuring suffering.
Second, semi-global consequentialists could accept a modified version of the principle that combined 'oughts' imply 'can' that makes an exception for cases of blameless wrongdoing.
