In terms of research design, our selected cases include directives with and without infringements, and with and without transposition delays.
The evidence shows that states' incentives to deviate and discretion affect the likelihood of infringements and delays.
Table 6 shows that, on average, policy performances that are the subject of infringements are subject to somewhat shorter transposition delays.
Table 3 also compares the cases with infringements and those without in relation to the discretion granted to member states in the directives.
The significant negative interaction term indicates that high discretion reduces the impact of incentives to deviate on the likelihood of infringements.
To be consistent, we must be willing to condemn infringements on the rights of the disenfranchised at home as well as abroad.
However, to stop the proliferation of conflicting standards, firms were encouraged to monitor implementation and infringements by rivals.
However, these scholars want to focus on explaining infringements which implies a different empirical focus.
