Legislation and regulation may be subject to higher-order rules (for example, constitutional rules, presidential vetoes, and international law).
Any of these vetoes would have raised the constitutional crisis to a higher level.
The president incurs this cost whenever he vetoes a prime ministerial cabinet proposal.
The first respect in which the agreement departs from consociational theory relates to group vetoes.
Vetoes were, then, a powerful corrective to unacceptable congressional amendments.
This pattern of institutional relations helps us to understand the use of presidential legislative resources such as vetoes and necessity and urgency decrees.
If all took up the invitation, there would be a grand coalition, but the constitution provided for no group vetoes, no ethnic autonomy, and no other consociational features.
Such a shared responsibility creates very different cooperative dynamics than in a situation where separate institutions endowed with their own institutional vetoes interact with each other.
