We now model in game-theoretic terms the process of cabinet appointment in parliamentary democracies with a presidential head of state.
The president, who is elected directly for a maximum of two 6-year terms, is the head of state.
Secondly, there is the date of appointment of a new government by the head of state.
If no coalition forms after all parties have made their demands, the head of state chooses another formateur and the sequential demand game repeats.
Power is therefore more than the gross power which the state, embodied in the head of state, exerts over its subjects.
As under the monarchy, official ceremonies once again set out to foster a sense of personal loyalty to the head of state.
At the top, there was the dualism between the ceremonial head of state, the emperor, and the military power-holder, the shogun.
Popular election enables the head of state to emerge outside party politics, and proportional representation virtually forces him or her to build electoral coalitions across or above political parties.
