0 a change in who has which job in an organization, especially a government -- başka bir işle görevlendirme
a government reshuffle
However, the propositions do show that ministerial restraint equilibria exist even in the face of costly reshuffles.
Our argument neither contradicts the traditional complaint that reshuffles undercut the accumulation of ministerial expertise nor denies that scandals may prompt reshuffles.
Propositions 2 and 3 consider this possibility and show that a ministerial restraint equilibrium exists if the cost of reshuffling the cabinet is sufficiently low.
First, reshuffles may induce ministers to limit their spending.
As discussed in the previous section, portfolio reshuffling might cause this sensitivity to be even greater when the subsidy level is lower.
Moreover, we show that we can transform generalised redexes into usual ones by a process called 'term reshuffling'.
The greater the potential for agency loss, the more likely or frequent reshuffles should become.
Let r 0 denote that the cabinet is not reshuffled.
