Most important, did their institutional behavior reflect direct responsiveness to state legislators, party bosses, business leaders, constituents, or some combination thereof?
In a polity with no parties whatsoever, individual legislators could further the interests of their locality unencumbered by considerations of the 'party's record'.
The legislative median is the position of the party that contains the median legislator, assuming all members of the party take the same position.
Therefore, we expect that legislators with less concentrated votes are more likely to run for higher office.
It guards against legislative self-interest by pitting one set of legislators against the other, neutralizing one ambition with another.
However, it should be noted that unlike other exchanges of personal services for political support, constituent service is a recognised formal function of legislators.
We think that argument can be extended to state legislators at the beginning of the twentieth century.
The moment is set amidst considerable and explicit unease on behalf of both legislators and judges.
