Примери за pre-election

• In other words, our models do not use the difference between pre-election and post-election system support as the dependent variable.

• During the pre-election interview respondents were asked if they would be willing to participate in the post election survey.

• For 1996, we used the general government trust pre-election measure to control for pre-election trust.

• Evidence of political manipulation would be a departure from the trends in an expansionary direction during the relevant pre-election periods.

• Adjustments to the minimum pension were not so concentrated in pre-election months, in part because the minimum pension was adjusted far more often.

• This hypothesis predicts that the pre-election surge in personal income growth is a monotonic decreasing function of the incumbent government's ex ante re-election prospects.

• Thirdly, the strategic environment in the pre-election year is different from that of the election year.

• Rather, change is modelled by controlling for pre-election attitudes in the model predicting post-election attitudes.

• As in 1972, pre-election trust and evaluations of the health of the macroeconomy turned out to be significant predictors of trust in government in 1996.

• More substantial changes in attitudes are evident between the pre-election and post-election observations.

• In the pre-election survey no neutral category is offered.

• The darker line indicates those respondents who participated in both waves while the lighter line indicates those who only participated in the pre-election wave.

• In the second model, post-election attitudes are estimated as a function of pre-election attitudes.

• Based on the theoretical expectations about opportunistic manipulation of the economy before elections, we should expect higher levels of government expenditure in the pre-election periods.

• The most consistent lever of pre-election manipulation was the minimum wage, which rose more than average in all four pre-vote periods.